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FEDERAL IMPROPER PAYMENT MANDATES
& THEIR FINANCIAL RISK FOR STATE GOVERNMENTS
A Practical Guide to Help States Mitigate Federal Improper Payment Mandates.

Abstract
As the recipient of billions in federal dollars, state governments are key
stakeholders in combatting improper payments. While federal improper payment
laws have mandated responsibility to federal agencies, states ultimately administer
numerous federal programs, thus are subject to the same improper payment laws.
Due to statistical sampling and extrapolation requirements in federal audits, state
governments are at a tremendous financial risk for federal disallowances in
administering federal programs. Federal reports and academic literature can inform
state governments on improving state policies to mitigate their financial risk of
federal improper payment laws.

Seth Grove
Martin School of Public Policy, University of Kentucky
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“This isn’t just about lines on a spreadsheet or numbers in a budget, because when we fail to
spend people’s tax dollars wisely, that’s money we’re not investing in better schools for our
kids or tax relief for families or innovation to create new industries and new jobs. When
government doesn’t work like it should, it has a real effect on people’s lives, on small business
owners who need loans, on young people who want to go to college, on the men and women
who’ve served this country and are trying to get the benefits that they’ve earned. And when we
continue to spend as if deficits don’t matter, that means our kids and our grandkids may wind
up saddled with debts that they’ll never be able to pay.”
President Barack H. Obama
July 22, 2010

Executive Summary
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that in federal fiscal year (FY) 2020
the federal government will have a deficit of $1.0 trillion or 4.6 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP).1 In 2030, the projected gap between expenditures and revenues will increase to
5.4 percent of GDP.2 Federal debt held by the public is currently at 91 percent of GDP and is
expected to increase to 180 percent of GDP in 2050, that will be the highest level ever recorded
in the United States.3 While deficits have declined during periods of economic expansion, large
deficits have continued despite consistent growth in the economy.4 Between 2012 and 2019, the
debt rose by nearly 6 percent annually compared with nominal GDP growth of about 4 percent.5
At the end of 2019, federal debt held by the public was equal to 79.2 percent of GDP, higher than
at any other time since just after World War II. In 2019, the government’s interest costs for debt
totaled $404 billion.6

1

Congressional Budget Office. “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030.” January 28, 2020.
Congressional Budget Office. “The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2020 to 2030.” January 28, 2020.
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Nevertheless, to put debt on a sustainable path, lawmakers would need to significantly
change tax and spending policies: increasing revenues more than under current law, reducing
spending below projected amounts, or adopting some combination of those approaches. The
more time that passes before changes are made, the greater the burden those changes will place
on future generations. It is unlikely, Congress will make the wholesale changes necessary to
bring the federal budget into balance. Instead, they will look for other revenue sources like
improper payments.
An improper payment is any payment that should not have been made or that was made
in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory,
contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements. They include:7
•

Any payments to an ineligible party or any payments for an ineligible good or
service.

•

Any duplicate payment.

•

Any payments for a good or service not received.

•

Any payments that do not account for applicable credit discounts.

•

Any payments where insufficient or lack of documentation prevents a reviewer
from discerning whether a payment was proper.

The federal government has expended numerous resources to uncover, calculate, and
reduce improper payments across the federal government through several bipartisan laws and
executive branch actions. Combined, these federal actions create the backbone of current
improper payment policies in the United States impacting subnational governments and federal
grant recipients. State governments view federal improper payment laws as unfunded mandates.

7

Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. Public Law 116-117, 116th Cong., 2nd sess. (March 2, 2020).
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Federal improper payments laws are written to ensure the federal government benefits from the
financial rewards of reducing improper payments.8 While the federal government reaps the
rewards of improper payment policies, state governments can face huge financial liabilities as the
federal government distributes $721 billion or 16 percent of its budget to state and local
governments.9 This is compounded by federal auditing requirements of statistical sampling and
extrapolation where small amounts in verified errors can lead to severe liabilities.10 Subnational
governments have tremendous financial risk, and states in particular, as they administer
numerous federal programs and receive numerous federal pass through dollars.
In order for state policymakers to mitigate the inherent risk in federal improper payment
policies, they must understand the historical context of how the improper payment policy
framework has been developed, how statistical sampling and extrapolation works, and what
current practices have been developed to mitigate improper payments. While the United States
Government Accounting Office (GAO) reports and scholarly literature can inform policymakers
about successful programs and policies developed for the federal government, research is lacking
for state government policymakers to mitigate their financial risk.
To inform state policymakers and continue the literature search on improper payments,
this paper reviews the development of federal improper payment laws and the GAO’s work on
improper payments reporting. Further, a literature review of improper payments is made to help

8

Edward Sheen. “Eliminating Improper Payments: A Review, Framework for Action and Seven Fundamental
Questions.” Journal of Government Financial Management, Winter 2006. Page 46.
9
Office of Management and Budget. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2019, Historical
Tables. Table 12.2. “Total Outlays for Grants to State and Local Governments, by Function and Fund Group: 1940–
2025”; and Table 14.2. “Total Government Expenditures: 1948–2019.”
10
“RY 2019 Pennsylvania Medicaid Payment Error Rate Measurement (PERM) Cycle 1 Summary Report.” Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services. November 26, 2019. Page 6.
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state policymakers develop policies and measures to mitigate financial risk of federal improper
payment mandates.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
• PROVIDE FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND UTILIZE FINANCIAL DISINCENTIVES
• STANDARDIZE REPORTING OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REPORTING INFORMATION
SYSTEM (PARIS) AND DO NOT PAY DATA SHARING PROGRAMS
• CLOSE AUDIT GAPS IN PAYMENT ERROR RATE MEASUREMENT (PERM)
REPORTS

STATE GOVERNMENT
• ADOPT A STATE LEVEL IMPROPER PAYMENT STATUTE ALIGNED TO THE
FEDERAL STATUTES
• ALIGN STATE INTERNAL CONTROLS TO THE FEDERAL “GREEN BOOK”
• MAXIMIZE USE OF FEDERAL DATA SHARING PROGRAMS AND ENSURE FOLLOW
UPS ARE COMPLETED
• CREATE STATE DATA SHARING PROGRAM
• SHIFT RISK TO SUBRECIPIENTS
• PROVIDE STATE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
• ENSURE TRANSPARENCY IN ACCOUNTING FOR AND REPORTING OF IMPROPER

5

“Of course, we have all known about the high rates of improper payments in all of these
programs for years now. And while these numbers, by their sheer size, are staggering, none of
them should be surprising. This is a problem that has been many years in the making. And if
you ask me, the time for addressing it is long past due.”
U.S. Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah)

Federal Improper Payment Laws
Federal statutes on improper payments did not happen overnight but were developed
through several pieces of legislation stretching over a decade. All the legislation passed with
unanimous votes of Congress, substantiating Congress’s collective view that improper payment
policies are a nonpartisan issue and a very important policy issue to both parties. The historical
development of federal improper payment laws lays a foundation of how the federal government
is setting policy which can inform state government policymakers of why current federal laws
are in place and how state governments can develop their own improper payment laws.
Congress has passed and the President has issued several substantial pieces of legislation
or executive orders to eliminate improper payments: The Improper Payments Information Act of
2002 (IPIA)11 12, Executive Order 1352013, The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery
Act of 2010 (IPERA)14, The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of
2012 (IPERIA)15, The Federal Improper Payments Coordination Act of 201516, and The Payment

12

Improper Payments Information Act of 2002, Public Law 107-333. 107th Cong. November 26, 2002.
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.” November 20, 2009.
14
Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Public Law, 111th Cong. July 22, 2010.
15
Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012, Public Law ,112th Cong. January 10,
2013.
16
Federal Improper Payments Coordination Act of 2015, 114th Cong. sess. (2015-2016).
13
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Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA)17. All these laws and executive orders have required
federal agencies to track and develop corrective action plans to reduce improper payments.
The Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA)
On November 26, 2002, President George W. Bush signed into law the IPIA. The IPIA
required agency heads, in accordance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to
review all programs and activities under their jurisdiction to identify the programs and activities
which may be susceptible to improper payments. For each program, the agency head is required
to estimate the annual amount of improper payments, submit those estimates to Congress,
provide corrective action plans to reduce improper payments, and include the estimates of
improper payments in the of agency’s budget submissions.
Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments & Presidential Memorandums
Seven years after the enactment of IPIA, President Barack Obama issued Executive
Order (EO) 13520 on reducing improper payments, which provided the backbone for all future
improper payment laws enacted by Congress. EO 13520 targeted four main areas18:
•

Transparency and Public Participation.

•

Agency Accountability and Coordination.

•

Enhanced Focus on Contractors and Working with State and Local Stakeholders.

•

Develop of Policy Recommendations.
The Transparency and Public Participation section of EO 13520 refocused improper

payment policy to address high-priority programs that have the highest dollar value or where the
majority of government-wide improper payments have occurred. It further required agencies to
publicize and set annual or semiannual targets for reducing improper payments in high-priority
17
18

Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019. Public Law 116-117, 116th Cong., 2nd sess. March 2, 2020.
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.” November 20, 2009.
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programs. Publication of improper payments through EO 13520 resulted in the creation of
www.PaymentAccuracy.gov operated by OMB that is required to be displayed on each agency’s
website.19 This website includes the names of the accountable agency officials designated to be
responsible for meeting agency improper payments targets; current and historical rates and
amounts of improper payments; current and historical rates and amounts of recovery of improper
payments; and the entities that have received the greatest amount of outstanding improper
payments.20 Lastly, this section required the Secretary of the United States Treasury to establish
an internet-based method to collect public information on suspected incidents of waste, fraud,
and abuse that have led to improper payments.21
The Agency Accountability and Coordination section required every agency to designate
a Senate-confirmed official to be accountable for meeting the improper payment targets under
EO 13520 without burdening program access and participation by eligible beneficiaries. The
agency’s designated official is required to submit a report to each agency Office of Inspector
General (OIG) that includes each agency’s methodology for identifying and measuring improper
payments; a plan, with supporting analysis, on how each agency will meet improper payment
targets; and a plan, with supporting analysis, to ensure the initiatives taken will not unduly
burden program access and participation by eligible beneficiaries.22 If agencies do not meet
their agency goals for two consecutive fiscal years, the agency is required to submit a report to
the agency’s OIG and Chief Financial Officer including a remedial plan and causes of the
agency’s failure.23 The Secretary of the United States Treasury is required to recommend to the

19

https://www.paymentaccuracy.gov/.
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
21
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
22
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
23
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
20

November 20, 2009. Page 2.
November 20, 2009. Page 2.
November 20, 2009. Pages 2-3.
November 20, 2009. Page 3.
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President methods to improve information sharing among agencies and subnational governments
to improve eligibility verification and pre-payment examination.24 Finally, this section of EO
13520 required agencies to develop a report to recover improper payments and prevent improper
payments in the future.25
The Enhanced Focus on Contractors and Working with State and Local Stakeholders
section of EO 13520 is designed to enhance government contractor accountability for improper
payments.26 This section established two different working groups of federal agencies, state
government officials, and local government officials to make recommendations on improving the
effectiveness of Single Audits to identify improper payments and eliminate minimal value
requirements and to improve incentives and accountability for subnational governments to
reduce improper payments.27 The last section of EO 13520 directed the Director of OMB to
develop policy recommendations to reduce improper payments to be included in the FY 2011
budget and future budgets.28
EO 13520 was followed up by two memorandums from President Obama in March and
June of 2010 to reinforce the executive branch’s efforts to curtail improper payments as laid out
in EO 13520. These two memorandums directed federal agencies to expand the use of payment
recapture audits or recovery audits and created the “Do Not Pay List”. A recovery audit is when
government subcontracts auditing work to a private entity, usually a certified public accountant

24

Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
26
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
27
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
28
Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.”
25

November 20, 2009. Page 3.
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or fraud examiner, on a contingency basis to examine payments in order to uncover duplicative
payments, payments for services not rendered, overpayments, and fictitious vendors.29
The Do Not Pay List memorandum of June 18, 2010 required federal agencies to utilize
current federal databases to ensure recipients of federal benefits are eligible.30 This prepayment
screening process requires agencies to use the Social Security Administration’s Death Master
File, the General Service Administration’s Excluded Parties List System, the Department of the
Treasury’s Debt Check Database, the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Credit
Alert System or Credit Alert Interactive Voice Response System, and the Department of Health
and Human Services’ Office of Inspector General’s List of Excluded Individuals/Entities.31 The
memorandum called this network of databases the “Do Not Pay List”.
The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA)
IPERA of 2010 consolidated IPIA of 2002 and the Recovery Audit Act of 200232. It
retained their core provisions, expanded the scope of recovery audits, and codified portions of
EO 13520. The most important aspects of IPERA were:
•

Established how agencies should estimate improper payments.

•

Established risk factors for agency heads to account for when analyzing improper
payments.

•

Established requirements on how agencies are to comply with IPERA.

29

Obama, Barack. “Memorandum: Finding and Recapturing Improper Payments.” Federal Register, Vol. 75, No.
49. March 10, 2020.
30
Obama, Barack. “Memorandum: Enhancing Payment Accuracy Though a “Do Not Pay List”.” Federal Register,
Vol. 75, No. 120. June 18, 2020. Page 1.
31
Obama, Barack. “Memorandum: Enhancing Payment Accuracy Though a “Do Not Pay List”.” Federal Register,
Vol. 75, No. 120. June 18, 2020. Page 1.
32
“Section 831 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002” P.L. 107-107, 107th Cong. November
26, 2002.
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The Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Improvement Act of 2012 (IPERIA)
IPERIA also made some minor changes to IPERA. It codified the Do Not Pay List in
EO15230, renamed it the Do Not Pay (DNP), and required all agencies for every program to use
DNP for all payments. It required OMB to designate a high-risk program list to focus efforts on
these programs. IPERIA also added new guidance for OMB to establish new standards for
sampling payments. It prohibited agencies from relying on self-reporting by recipients for
estimates, required agencies to report all improper payments in their estimates including those
payments recovered or in the process of being recovered, and required agencies to include
payments to employees in their estimates.
The Federal Improper Payments Coordination Act of 2015
The Federal Improper Payments Coordination Act of 2015 improved the data sharing of
the DNP between agencies and expanded its use to states, including any state contractor or agent,
and the judicial or legislative branches of government. It also required federal agencies to
review the death records maintained by the Social Security Administration.
The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019
The Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 reorganized and revised all the improper
payments laws. It allowed OMB to establish one or more pilot programs and required OMB to
update its plan for improving the Social Security Administration’s death data. Finally, it
established an interagency working group on payment integrity that includes state and local
government officials.
The federal government has put significant time and resources into developing federal
improper payment laws both within the executive and legislative branches. Over seventeen

11

years, Congress has passed five major laws to detect and curb improper payments in federal
programs. Regardless of the efforts by Congress and other means, it is impossible to stop every
improper payment in every program.

12

“Every single taxpayer dollar that is misallocated takes precious resources
away from programs meant to serve our nation’s most vulnerable.”
U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)

United States Government Accountability Office Reports
Between 2009 and 2013, estimated improper payments fluctuated in amount, but have
been increasing since 2013. For 2019, improper payments for Medicaid and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) reintegrated eligibility into the Payment Error Rate
Measurement (PERM) which contributes to the increase. Eligibility had been part of the PERM

Figure 1 Data from PaymentAccuracy.gov operated by the U.S. OMB

reporting prior to 2015, but the Obama administration suspended it from federal fiscal years
2015 – 2018. PERM is the process used by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) to
conform to federal improper payment laws and to calculate improper payment error rates for
Medicaid and CHIP.33

33

https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicaid-and-CHIPCompliance/PERM/lawsandregulations.
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Root causes of improper payments are grouped into the following major categories by
OMB:
•

Insufficient documentation to determine,

•

Administrative or process errors,

•

Inability to authenticate eligibility,

•

Program design or structural issues,

•

Medical necessity,

•

Failure to verify data, and

•

Other reasons.34

Figure 2 Data as Reported by U.S. GAO.

34

“Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies’ Estimates of FY 2019 Improper Payments.” United States Government
Accountability Office. March 2020. Pages 24-25.
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Insufficient documentation to determine is the largest category representing 42.4 percent of
all improper payments in FY 2019.35 Insufficient documentations encompass payments made
without the required supporting documentation. Administrative or process errors are 22.4
percent of improper payments and are caused by incorrectly entering data, misclassifying data, or
incorrectly processing applications or payments.36 The first two categories alone represent 64.8
percent of all improper payments made in FY 2019 and indicate large amounts of correctable
errors within federal programs.
Since October 1999, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) has produced numerous
reports to Congress about improper payments.37 For 2019, the GAO reported improper payment
estimates for fiscal year 2019 totaling approximately $175 billion, which is an increase of $24
billion over the previous fiscal year. Sixty-nine percent or $121 billion was concentrated in three
areas: (1) Medicaid, (2) Medicare, and (3) Earned Income Tax Credit.38 Of these three,
Medicaid is the only shared program with state governments and represented $57.4 billion or
14.9 percent of program expenditures.39
Coordination between state governments and the federal government had focused on
technical assistance and guidance from the federal government to state governments in order for
states to estimate improper payments.40 The GAO found the most effective tool for state

35

“Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies’ Estimates of FY 2019 Improper Payments.” United States Government
Accountability Office. March 2020. Page 24.
36
“Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies’ Estimates of FY 2019 Improper Payments.” United States Government
Accountability Office. March 2020. Page 24.
37
“Financial Management: Increased Attention Needed to Prevent Billions in Improper Payments.” United States
Government Accountability Office. October 1999.
38
“Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies’ Estimates of FY 2019 Improper Payments.” United States Government
Accountability Office. March 2020. Page 7.
39
“Payment Integrity: Federal Agencies’ Estimates of FY 2019 Improper Payments.” United States Government
Accountability Office. March 2020. Page 20.
40
“Medicaid: State Efforts to Control Improper Payments Vary.” United States Government Accountability Office.
June 2001. Page 5.
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governments to engage in improper payment detection and reduction efforts is to make it part of
federal program requirements.41 The GAO survey data showed that 50 states and the District of
Columbia estimated improper payments for federal programs when the federal programs
required , 29 states voluntarily entered a pilot program to estimate improper payments on a
limited set of federal programs, and 11 states started their own initiatives.42
The GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, also known as the
Green Book, cites five components of internal control to detect and reduce improper payments:
•

Control Environment

•

Risk Assessment

•

Control Activities

•

Information/Communication

•

Monitoring

Out of these five components, states use risk assessment and computer related techniques
to detect and reduce improper payments.43 Further, 15 states are utilizing recovery audits by
contracting with an auditing firm on a contingent fee or auditing by using in-house audits. States
reported recovering $180 million in FY 2003 and $155 million in FY 2004.44
29 CFR Section 97.51 (Later Disallowances and Adjustments) and 42 CFR Section
430.42 (Disallowance of Claims for FFP) permit federal agencies to recover federal funds that

“Improper Payments: Federal and State Coordination Needed to Report National Improper Payment Estimates on
Federal Programs.” United States Government Accounting. April 2006. Pages 9-11.
42
“Improper Payments: Federal and State Coordination Needed to Report National Improper Payment Estimates on
Federal Programs.” United States Government Accounting. April 2006. Page 9.
43
“Improper Payments: Federal and State Coordination Needed to Report National Improper Payment Estimates on
Federal Programs.” United States Government Accounting. April 2006. Pages 16-17.
44
“Improper Payments: Federal and State Coordination Needed to Report National Improper Payment Estimates on
Federal Programs.” United States Government Accounting. April 2006. Page 19.
41
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were not allowed by states or other entities. Further, the federal government provides a few
incentives and disincentives or penalties for reducing improper payments. Only the Food Stamp
Program statute provides incentives and disincentives for state governments to reduce improper
payments.45 The federal government requires states to complete a Payment Error Rate
Measurement (PERM) Report every three years to determine the improper payment rate for
Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This report analyzes improper
payments through testing claim samples and applying the samples to the entire program. After a
state completes its PERM report, the state is required to file a corrective action plan with the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and then the state is assigned a new
improper payment target rate by the federal government. If a state does not meet its target rate
for two consecutive PERM Reports, the amount above the targeted payment rate and the actual
improper payment rate becomes a disallowance and the state must reimburse the federal
government for this amount. To date, the federal government has not applied a disallowance for
PERM reports.

“Improper Payments: Federal and State Coordination Needed to Report National Improper Payment Estimates on
Federal Programs.” United States Government Accounting. April 2006. Page 21.
45
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“Horror is a reaction; it's not a genre.”
John Carpenter – Movie Director

Statistical Sampling and Extrapolation
Extrapolation is “the action of estimating or concluding something by assuming that
existing trends will continue, or a current method will remain applicable.” It is impossible for
auditors to audit every claim, so under Medicaid, the federal government and states have used
statistical sampling to uncover improper payments and apply extrapolation to the entire
program.46
In 1975, the Seventh Circuit ruled extrapolation to be a valid audit technique and the
federal government adopted the ruling a few years later into statute.47 On January 15, 2020, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) allowing CMS to use extrapolation in Palm Valley Health Care,
Inc. v. Azar (Palm Valley Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, No. 18-41067, 2020 BL 14097 (5th Cir. Jan.
15, 2020)).48 This case specifically shows the impact of extrapolation and how it provides
extreme financial risk to subnational governments and final recipients of federal dollars. In the
Palm Valley case, CMS’s contractor conducted an audit due to Palm Valley’s unusually high
submission of claims. The contractor, using CMS’s selected methodology, selected 54 claims to
review out of the 10,699 filed during the audit period. The contractor found 29 of the 54 claims
were overpayments totaling $81,681 with an error rate of 53.7%. Penn Valley used the appeals

Heyeck, Larry. “Medicaid Overpayments: The Use of Statistical Sampling and Extrapolation.” Health Lawyer.
07363443, August 2016, Vol. 28, Issue 6. Page 2-3.
47
Heyeck, Larry. “Medicaid Overpayments: The Use of Statistical Sampling and Extrapolation.” Health Lawyer.
07363443, August 2016, Vol. 28, Issue 6. Page 3.
48
Jeffrey Alberg. “Federal Court Upholds CMS’ Use of Extrapolation to Claw-Back Improper Payments.” February
17, 2020.
46
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process and the administrative law judge ruled four of the 29 claims invalid. Using
extrapolation, CMS required Penn Valley to pay $12,589,185. Ultimately, the actual $81,681 in
overpayments ended up costing Penn Valley $12.5 million in reimbursements to the federal
government. As the federal government continues to deficit spend and focus on improper
payment policies, subnational governments, and other subrecipients of federal funds must be
cognizant of the federal government’s use of improper payment recoveries as a revenue source.
Minnesota was recently required to repay the federal government $73 million because the
state was making payments to substance abuse providers in violation of federal law.49 This
happened because Minnesota pays for substance abuse through a consolidated fund of federal
and state dollars. The providers should have been paid through state dollars only and not federal
dollars. In August of 2019, the Office of Inspector General for the United States Department of
Health and Human Services released an audit of Florida’s Low-Income Pool Program. The audit
showed Jackson Memorial Hospital received $412 million more than its allowable costs and was
required to repay this amount back to the federal government.50
The PERM process for Medicaid relies heavily on statistical sampling and extrapolation
in determining improper payment rates. It is impossible for either the federal government or
state governments to audit every payment made under Medicaid. For example, Pennsylvania’s
2019 PERM Report (Figure 3) reflects the impact of extrapolation. For Medicaid’s Fee for
Service (FFS) program, 75 actual errors were found in 761 audit samples creating an error rate of
22.21%. The error rate for the sample was then applied to the entire program creating the

Faircloth, Ryan. “Minnesota owes the feds $48 million for Improper Medicaid Payments.” Pioneer Press. August
26, 2019.
50
Chiedi, Joanne M. “Florida Medicaid Paid Hundreds of Millions to Jackson Memorial Hospital Under Its LowIncome Pool Program.” Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. August 2009.
Report in Brief.
49
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projected federal dollars in error. This means the actual federal dollars in error from the sample

Pennsylvania 2019 PERM Report Sample Errors

Medicaid Program
Component
Medicaid FFS
Medicaid Managed Care
Medicaid Eligibility

# of
# of
Sample
Sample Claims in Sample Federal
Claims
Error
Dollars in Error
761
75
$90,548
40
0
$0
677
201
$96,160

Projected
Federal Dollars
in Error
$519,992,086
$0
$1,821,156,133

% of
Total
Projected
Federal
Dollars in
Error
22.21%
0.00%
77.79%

Figure 3: Data from 2019 PERM Report for Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and reflects the impact of extrapolation on state
financial liabilities.

of $90,548 was increased to $519,992,086 in projected federal dollars in error after
extrapolation.
While this should be terrifying to state budget analysts, the samples are the key to
extrapolation analyses. In Pennsylvania’s 2019 PERM Report, Medicaid Managed Care had 40
sample claims with no claims in error. Had the sample pulled 40 different samples but those
sample claims with say 20 errors, the error rate would have been 50 percent. This would have
increased the total projected federal dollars in error and the state’s financial liability to the
federal government. As shown in figure 3, the Medicaid Eligibility program with 201 errors out
of 677 sample claims resulted in $1.8 billion in projected federal dollars in error.
Medicaid Managed Care is a unique program as the federal government only requires an
audit of dollars paid from state government to managed care organizations (MCOs) called
capitated payments. These audits are data process reviews not medical reviews.51 Therefore,
Medicaid Managed Care has a smaller sample size and lower payment error rate. The PERM

51

Office of Financial Management, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. “Payment Error Rate
Measurement (PERM) Overview.” January 2014. Page 4. https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Monitoring-Programs/Medicaid-and-CHIP-Compliance/PERM/Downloads/PERMOverview.pdf
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report does not reflect the payment error rates of MCOs that make payments to providers or a
medical review of these payments as PERM requires for FFS.
Medicaid eligibility reflects how well states verify eligibility of Medicaid recipients in
their states. This is new for the 2019 PERM cycle and will establish a new baseline of improper
payments for Medicaid after all the state PERM reports are completed in 2021.
Eligibility disallowance is another area covered in PERM reports. Based on
Pennsylvania’s 2019 PERM report, the total extrapolated dollars for disallowance were
$908,011,385 due to eligibility disallowances.52 Since eligibility disallowances were not in
effect and Pennsylvania met its good faith effort established by Section 1903(u) of the Social
Security Act, Pennsylvania will not face repaying the federal government $908 million. 53
However, CMS expects to recover the federal shares from FFS and managed care overpayments
found in error in Pennsylvania on a claim-by-claim basis.54 Section 1903(u) of the Social
Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the ability to recover any
improper payment over an error rate of 0.03 or 3 percent.55

5252

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. “Notification of RY 2019 Medicaid Improper Payment Rates.”
November 26, 2019. Page 2.
53
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. “Notification of RY 2019 Medicaid Improper Payment Rates.”
November 26, 2019. Page 2.
54
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. “Notification of RY 2019 Medicaid Improper Payment Rates.”
November 26, 2019. Page 2.
55
42 U.S. Code CHAPTER 7—SOCIAL SECURITY, Section 1904(u).
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“The government solution to a problem is usually as bad as the problem.”
Milton Friedman

Identified Solutions in Literature
Much of the research on improper payments focuses on federal agencies, but over almost
two decades of work by federal agencies, we can glean best practices that states can adopt to
detect, reduce, and eliminate improper payments. The four main steps to reducing improper
payments are identify/analyze root causes, preventative controls, detective controls, and
collaboration with other entities.56
Four Steps to Reduce Improper Payments
Uniform guidance cannot be provided for all agencies to follow regarding lowering improper
payments.57 By utilizing the four steps of analyzing root-causes, implementing preventative
controls, implementing detective controls, and creating collaboration with other entities
governments, it is possible to establish effective tools to reduce and eliminate improper
payments. The four steps are listed and discussed below:

4 Steps to Reducing Improper Payments
Step 1 Root-cause Analysis
Step 2 Preventative Controls
Step 3 Detective Controls
Step 4 Collaboration with Other Entities

Beryl Davis, Jim Healy, and Phillip McIntyre. “Strategies to Help Curb Improper Payments.” A Journal of
Government Financial Management. Fall 2017. Page 58.
57
Elizabeth Owens and Carol Jessup. “Federal Improper Payments: An Overview.” Journal of Financial
Management, Summer 2014. Page 16.
56
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•

Root-cause analysis is the first step in addressing improper payments.58 Analyzing the
root causes of improper payments helps inform management and policymakers what
weaknesses are resulting from inadequate internal controls or program integrity policies.
In addition, root-causes at the agency or program level must be identified to inform
management and policymakers on further actions needed to eliminate improper
payments.

•

Preventative controls are internal controls used by agencies to ensure correct payments
prior to the payment being made. These controls are important because they avoid the
need to recover dollars, and most importantly increase public confidence in program
administration.59

•

Detective controls are internal controls used on the back end once payments are made.
These controls review payments to identify improper payments and provide the
information on why they were made.60

•

Collaboration with other entities has been imbedded in most federal improper payment
statutes. Since states administer federal programs, like unemployment compensation and
Medicaid, and subnational governments are recipients of billions in federal expenditures,
it is beneficial for collaboration between these stakeholders to take place to improve
program administration.61
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Beryl Davis, Jim Healy, and Phillip McIntyre. “Strategies to Help Curb Improper Payments.” A Journal of
Government Financial Management Fall 2017. Page 58.
59
Beryl Davis, Jim Healy, and Phillip McIntyre. “Strategies to Help Curb Improper Payments.” A Journal of
Government Financial Management Fall 2017. Page 58.
60
Beryl Davis, Jim Healy, and Phillip McIntyre. “Strategies to Help Curb Improper Payments.” A Journal of
Government Financial Management Fall 2017. Page 58.
61
Beryl Davis, Jim Healy, and Phillip McIntyre. “Strategies to Help Curb Improper Payments.” A Journal of
Government Financial Management Fall 2017. Page 58.
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Within these four steps to reduce improper payments, the research has further identified best
practices. The best practices range from corrective action plans and transparency, to data sharing
programs.
Corrective Action Plans
A corrective action plan (CAP) is a step-by-step plan of action developed to achieve
targeted outcomes to resolve identified errors as well as:
•

Identify the most cost-effective actions that can be implemented to correct the causes of
errors.

•

Improve processes or methods so outcomes are more effective and efficient.

•

Achieve measurable improvement.

•

Eliminate repeated deficient practices.
Once root causes are identified, agencies should develop corrective action plans designed

to eliminate improper payments.62 State governments are required under federal law to develop
corrective action plans for Single Audits, Food Stamp Program, Medicaid and CHIP.63 64 65 For
Medicaid and CHIP, corrective action plans must address all errors in the PERM and all other
deficiencies identified. Also, for Medicaid and CHIP eligibility, an evaluation of whether state
actions will reduce eligibility errors and improper payments must be reduced.

62

Wendy Morton-Huddleston, Calandra Layne, and Hudson Riehle. “Marching On! Sustaining Improper Payments
Prevention Program.” Journal of Government Financial Management, Winter 2016-2017. Page 14.
63
7 CFR § 275.17 - State corrective action plan.
64
42 CFR § 431.992 - Corrective action plan.
65
2 CFR § 200.511 - Audit findings follow-up.
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Transparency
IPERIA requires federal agencies to publicly:
•

Disclose improper payments estimates.

•

Identify the methodology for calculating improper payments.

•

Identify improper payment reduction targets.

•

Publish improper payment risk-assessments for all programs deemed high-risk.

•

Place improper payment amounts in their Agency Financial Report (AFR).66

The publishing of improper payments helps to inform the public of the issues surrounding
program integrity and internal controls as well as hold government agencies accountable for
meeting improper payment reduction targets. While the federal government has robust
transparency requirements, subnational governments do not usually disclose improper payments
since such disclosures would essentially expose large and difficult to fix state problems that may
have potentially adverse political repercussions.67 For example, the State of Kentucky has a
statute which requires state agencies to report their improper payments to the Legislative
Research Commission.68 Neither the state agency nor the Legislative Research Commission is
required to publicly disclose reported amounts of improper payments. Further, federal statutes
governing corrective action plan mandates for state governments do not require states to publicly
disclose their corrective action plans.

Wendy Morton-Huddleston, Calandra Layne, and Hudson Riehle. “Marching On! Sustaining Improper Payments
Prevention Program.” Journal of Government Financial Management, Winter 2016-2017. Page 13.
67
Edward Sheen. “Eliminating Improper Payments: A Review, Framework for Action and Seven Fundamental
Questions.” Journal of Government Financial Management, Winter 2006. Page 46.
68
KRS 45.237 (7). Establishment of internal controls and preaudit procedures for state agencies -- Collection of
improper payments -- Referral of certified debts by agency or local government to Department of Revenue -Information to be provided to State Treasurer.
66
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Data Sharing Programs
On November 20, 2009, President Barrack Obama signed Executive Order 13520 –
Reducing Improper Payments, which directed federal agencies to start the improper payment
process of identifying and recovering improper payments.69 He followed up this executive order
on June 18, 2010 with a memorandum creating the Do Not Pay List that required the Office of
Management and Budget to coordinate with other agencies to utilize current lists maintained by
the federal government in order to reduce improper payments through pre-payment
verifications.70 The Do Not Pay List was codified as the Do Not Pay Program under the United
States Treasury in the IPERIA of 2012. Most of the literature points to Do Not Pay as a
resounding success and its use is a leading recommendation for combating improper payments.71
72 73

In February 2020, the State of Oregon released an audit of Oregon Health and Human
Services Program’s use of the Do Not Pay program.74 The audit report cited several positive
outcomes of the state utilizing the Do Not Pay program:

69

•

Generated a return on investment of $286 in savings for every $1 spent.

•

Identified over $790,000 in financial benefits.

Obama, Barrack. “Executive Order 13520 – Reducing Improper Payments.” November 20, 2009.

Obama, Barrack. “Memorandum: Enhancing Payment Accuracy Through a “Do Not Pay List”. June 10, 2010.
Bryan Reece Clark. “Kafkaesque Dangers: IPERIA, Do Not Pay, and the Government’s New Fight Against
Improper Payments.” Iowa Law Review, Vol 102, 1719, Pages 1721, 1756.
72
Danny Werfel and Jeffery C. Steinoff. “Are You Combat Ready to Win the War Against Improper Payments?”
Journal of Government Financial Management, Summer 2014. Page 21.
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Elizabeth Owens and Carol Jessup. “Federal Improper Payments: An Overview.” Journal of Financial
Management, Summer 2014. Page 14.
74
Garber, Will, Furnish, Teresa, Green, Ian, and Faulkner, Sheila. “Using the U.S. Treasury’s Do Not Pay System
for Health and Human services Programs Will Save Taxpayers Money.” Oregon Audits Division, Secretary of
State, State of Oregon. February 2020.
70
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•

Reported it took ten days of staff time with a cost of $2,750 in salary and benefits to
generate the information.

•

Identified data quality issues for the federal government and state government.

•

Identified potential compliance issues.

•

Identified internal control weaknesses.

•

Verified effectiveness of state integrity programs.

The Do Not Pay program has great merit in helping subnational governments to reduce
improper payments. Under PIIA of 2019, the Do Not Pay program was given expressed
permission to coordinate with state governments. The Do Not Pay program requires the
involvement of an interagency working group including input from state administered federal
programs.
The Public Assistance Reporting Information System (PARIS) is a data analytics system
administered by the Administration for Children and Families (ACF) in order to improve
integrity within the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, the Food Stamp

Number of
Potential
Avoidable Cases
for SNAP, TANF
& Medicaid
State
Colorado
4715
Kansas
1925
Maine
800
New Mexico
1870

Improper
Payment
Avoidance Cost
$9,377,443 $103,909
$1,986,284 $66,725
$1,329,167 $51,733
$3,776,010 $66,005

Net Savings
$9,273,534
$1,919,559
$1,277,432
$3,710,005

Figure 4: 2008 Annualized estimates of improper payment avoidance and net savings related to closing all potential SNAP, TANF
and Medicaid avoidable cases.
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program (SNAP), and Medicaid.75 PARIS is designed for data matching and information
exchange between state governments and between the federal government and state
governments. It is comprised of three matches: Interstate Match, VA Match, and Federal
Match.76 The Interstate Match uses social security numbers of public assistance consumers to
determine if an individual is enrolled in multiple states. 77 The VA Match provides the states
information from the United States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) on state public
assistance consumers, who are receiving income and medical assistance payments from the
VA.78 The Federal Match provides the states with data from the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Office of Personnel Management to verify if consumers are receiving payments
or federal health coverage from the DOD or federal employment.79 PARIS is a voluntary
program and states can opt in one or all three of the data match systems.80 When a state receives
a match, the state is expected to send the match hits for follow up investigation to appropriate
agency employees.81 These match hits inform states of consumers who have not informed their
former state of residence they have moved to a different state or cases of fraud when the
consumer is deliberately attempting to receive government benefits from multiple states. 82 As of
75

“Evaluation to Determine the Effectiveness of the Public Assistance Reporting and Information System.” Health
Systems Research, Inc., an Altarum Company. June 30, 2007. Page 1.
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Evaluation to Determine the Effectiveness of the Public Assistance Reporting and Information System.” Health
Systems Research, Inc., an Altarum Company. June 30, 2007. Page 1.
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Systems Research, Inc., an Altarum Company. June 30, 2007. Page 1.
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Systems Research, Inc., an Altarum Company. June 30, 2007. Page 1.
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Systems Research, Inc., an Altarum Company. June 30, 2007. Page 1.
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Systems Research, Inc., an Altarum Company. June 30, 2007. Page 1.
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“Public Assistance: PARIS Project Can Help States Reduce Improper Benefit Payments.” Report to the Ranking
Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. U.S. General Accounting Office. September
2001. Page 5.
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Minority Member, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate. U.S. General Accounting Office. September
2001. Page 5.
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February 2020, 38 states participate in the VA Match83, all 50 states participate in the Interstate
Match,84 and 45 states participate in the Federal Match85.
While the data points to the successes of PARIS, there also have been weaknesses of
PARIS. For example, states are not completing the follow up case investigations, which means
state governments are going through the expense of using PARIS for the data match, but they are
not following up to resolve cases.86 87 Another identified weakness is documenting follow up
activities to capture outcomes and provide accountability to the program.88
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“You will not be able to understand the performance of
your company without good quality data to measure it.”
Pearl Zhu

Analysis and Findings
This qualitative research paper was designed after a thorough review of federal improper
payment laws, policies, and implementation strategies. The goal is to inform state policymakers
on what federal improper payments entail and how they impact state governments. The concepts
of this research paper focused on the historical development of federal improper payment laws,
United States Government Accountability Office Reports (GAO) on improper payments and
scholarly research.
Federal improper payment laws, while well intentioned and needed, push down
enforcement and the responsibility of administering the laws to the managers of federal programs
while creating financial liabilities for these same entities. The federal government, within the
constructs of federal improper payment laws, has attempted to develop working groups with
stakeholders to elevate the discussion and prioritize the reduction of improper payments at the
subnational level. However, we have not seen a robust policy discussion of improper payments
at the subnational level. Outside of state auditors or internal state agency discussions, state
governments have not created or aligned policies to mitigate their financial risks or created a
governance structure for state agencies to address and comply with federal improper payment
requirements.
The development of substantial federal improper payment laws by Congress during the
past decade reflects a change of policy from solely reporting improper payments to addressing
root causes of improper payments as well as providing accuracy in calculating improper
30

payments. Through the statutory history of federal improper payment laws, transparency has
always been at the forefront of legislative decisions to inform the public of the scope of improper
payments and to ensure there is accountability in addressing improper payments. The
development of improper payment laws also reflects the ability of federal agencies to better
assess and calculate improper payments. While federal improper payments laws were originally
developed under IPIA of 2002 as a government-wide approach, these laws were narrowed to
high-risk programs as federal agencies and Congress realized that addressing billions of dollars
in improper payments simultaneously throughout the entire federal government was impossible.
Research at the subnational level on improper payment policy and programs is lacking,
especially since these entities face the requirements of administering federal programs and are
recipients of billions of dollars in federal grants. Analyzing the effectiveness of public integrity
programs at the state level will help inform policymakers and citizens about the effectiveness of
federal improper payment laws and create a better understanding of federal and subnational
interactions.
As reflected in the Minnesota case referred to earlier, state governments are liable for
misappropriations by subrecipients that violate the provisions of federal laws and regulations.
State governments have a fiduciary responsibility to ensure the subrecipients of federal dollars
that have been allocated or awarded federal contracts or grants, use the funds according to
federal guidance. The Minnesota and Jackson Memorial Hospital cases are reminders to state
policymakers and subrecipients of federal dollars, that federal disallowances can have severe
financial consequences.
Literature research demonstrates the success of data sharing programs between the
federal agencies and between the federal government and state governments. Programs like
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DNP and PARIS have shown success in uncovering improper payments, saving taxpayers’
dollars, and verifying the success or failure of internal controls at the federal and state levels of
government. Data sharing among the GAO reports and scholarly research reflects a universal
recommendation for addressing improper payments throughout government. Data sharing helps
clarify data issues between states and with the federal government. This ensures more accurate
data which drives better outcomes.

32

“Sunlight is the best disinfectant.”
Associate Justice William O. Douglas

Recommendations
Based on the literature review from the GAO reports and research, there are several
recommendations for the federal government and state governments to adopt.
Federal Government Recommendations
Federal laws can recover federal dollars spent by subnational governments; the
subnational governments reimburse the federal government using the tax revenues they collect.
This is a large hammer, but it is a hammer the federal government rarely uses. The threat is real,
however, for the federal government to utilize its disallowance capabilities. At some point, the
federal government needs to either utilize all its tools or repeal them. At the same time, the
federal government has provided shared savings policies when subnational governments save
federal dollars as an incentive for the subnational governments to focus on reducing improper
payments. The Federal False Claims Act (FCA) update in 1986 provided a ten percent increase
in the state Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP) when calculating FCA settlements as
an incentive for state governments to adopt a federally compliant state-level FCA89. The federal
government also provides savings sharing provisions within the Food Stamp Program as an
incentive for state governments to reduce improper payments and reduce costs. Federal Food
Stamp Program is administered by states, but state governments currently do not have any
financial stake in the program. These shared savings policies can easily be adopted within
federal improper payment laws and within all federal programs administered by state
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governments to provide financial incentives to address improper payments and reduce costs.
When revising improper payment laws, the federal government needs to apply the correct
amount of incentives and disincentives for subnational governments to take federal improper
payment laws seriously.
Federal data sharing programs like DNP and PARIS have been successful and low-cost
solutions to improper payment reductions. Federal policymakers should work to have every state
utilize these programs through outreach programs and outcomes assessments. Sharing successful
results from data sharing programs will further encourage states to utilize the systems. As the
PARIS program research indicates, the federal government must create uniform reporting criteria
to track and calculate costs and benefits from these programs.
The federal government also must close audit gaps in the PERM reports. FFS is being
phased out as a delivery system for Medicaid and is being replaced by managed care.90 PERM
reports need to expand their sampling to include payments made from MCOs to providers and
not just from the state to MCOs. This will capture the real costs of Medicaid improper payments
and close an audit gap.
State Government Recommendations
State governments are the key stakeholders in the federal government’s efforts to curb
improper payments. The federal government should continue its policy of establishing working
groups with states and other stakeholders to improve improper payment reduction policies and
programs.
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State Improper Payment Statues
State governments should align state laws with federal improper payment laws. State
agencies that expend federal dollars are already under federal mandate to align with federal laws
and policies. Therefore, it makes sense to align state-only dollars for improper payments as well.
Further, state policies can better drive cost/benefit models. The literature for PARIS shows there
needs to be a greater effort in calculating costs and savings. State level improper payment laws
will allow states and the federal government to reduce recovery efforts by ensuring payments are
accurate before they are made. Alignment of federal and state improper payment laws is a
crucial step in reducing improper payments.
State improper payment laws can be adopted government wide. Alternatively, a state can
begin with agencies already operating under federal improper payment laws and then expand the
scope of a state improper payment law to capture all state agencies over time. Regardless of how
a state implements its state improper payment laws, it should start with risk assessments and
focus its efforts on the high-risk programs first. Current federal risk assessments on federal
programs can assist states in determining which programs are high-risk.
State improper payment laws should also include a working group, at minimum,
consisting of the state’s budget officer, state treasurer, state auditor, state inspector general,
bipartisan legislative appointments (preferably two from each chamber representing each
political party), director of state internal auditors, chief information officer, representatives from
subrecipients like hospitals, non-profits, local governments, school districts, and the auditing
firm contracted to complete the state’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) and
Single Audit. This working group should evaluate the effectiveness of internal controls, review
annual and quarterly improper payment data, establish annual improper payment reduction
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benchmarks for state agencies or specific programs, and analyze the effectiveness of data sharing
between all levels of government.
Internal Controls
State governments should align their internal controls to the GAO’s Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government through executive action or codifying it in statute,
which would be preferable. A unified internal control system between the federal government
and state government will only help to inform decision makers on internal control weaknesses,
that has been and will continue to be a leading cause of improper payments. Internal controls are
key to implementing a successful improper payment reduction program. The goal of improper
payments reduction laws is for government agencies to get the payments correct the first time.
Data Sharing
As the literature points out, PARIS and DNP are two of the most successful programs in
addressing improper payments. State governments should ensure all state agencies that make
expenditures using federal dollars are also utilizing DNP. State agencies which operate
Medicaid programs should be using all data match functions of PARIS. Further, state
governments should statutorily mandate state agencies follow up on outcomes of data sharing
programs and should report on their effectiveness through annual cost-benefit analysis including
recommendations to improve these programs.
State governments also collect substantial data including medical claims data, death
certificates, and many other forms of data. State data sources should be used to develop data
sharing programs at the state level modeled after DNP. This will further help to ensure accurate
data and increased data resources available to expand on the successful federal data sharing
programs.
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Subrecipient Contracts
State governments are liable for federal dollars that pass-through state government to
subrecipients. If there is a federal disallowance creating a financial liability, state governments
need to ensure their contracts with subrecipients of federal dollars clearly document that the
subrecipients are liable for disallowances created by their errors. This appropriately apportions
financial risk of federal improper payments laws between the state governments and subrecipient
entities receiving federal funds. Proper contracts increase the financial risk of subrecipients to
ensure they are compliant with federal laws and regulations thereby providing additional
accountability.
Legislative Oversight
The state legislative branch must engage in oversight operations of federal improper
payment laws by holding agencies, especially those with corrective action plans, accountable and
meeting federally established improper payment reduction targets. If state agencies know the
legislative branch is invested in addressing improper payments, the agencies will escalate their
interest as well. Legislative oversight also means there will be more transparency about
improper payments created through public hearings, where the public will be more exposed to
and better informed about improper payments. These efforts will help shape public support for
improper payment policies.
Transparency
Transparency is the best cure for most government oversight problems. The federal
government provides robust websites like www.PaymentAccuracy.gov and the U.S. GAO
websites where you can easily search for all reports on improper payments. State governments,
however, are not posting their improper payment reports on their agency websites, excluding the
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corrective action plans from their Single Audits. Not one Cycle 1 state posted their PERM
report. Even the federal government has yet to formally release state PERM reports.
This lack of state government transparency around federal improper payment reports and
data should not come as a surprise, but it shows the extent government agencies will go to not
acknowledge a problem. Lack of transparency prevents state government from obtaining viable
solutions to existing improper payment problems. While there may be numerous reasons why
state agencies want to hide federal improper payment reports, state legislatures should adopt
statutes requiring the public release of this information on state agency websites. Further, state
budget offices should create a one-stop website for the collection and disclosure of agency
improper payment reports, corrective action plans, and status of the corrective action plans.
As state governments have not even begun to contemplate improper payment policies or
deployed comprehensive strategies for combatting improper payments, they are creating
unnecessary financial risk for their taxpayers. Combined, these simple recommendations can put
state governments on a path to reducing improper payments and ultimately reducing their
financial risk. States must act quickly to catch up to the federal government on establishing
appropriate policies, as the federal government continues its focus on reducing improper
payments.
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Conclusion
An April 11, 2019 poll of Americans showed only 17 percent of the public say they trust
the federal government to do what is right.91 While public trust is up about ten percent since its
low point on April 21, 2011, overall public trust in the federal government has declined since
October 15, 1964 by 77 percent.92 As the federal government reports on the estimated $175
billion of improper payments made in FY 2019, the public trust decreases as the public sees
inefficiencies and government waste. Governments must continue to work on internal controls
to ensure government programs are as efficient and effective as possible.
As the literature has shown, there is no silver bullet that will magically eliminate
improper payments. Governments, both the federal and subnational, must make their eradication
of improper payments a priority and dedicate resources to implement the needed policy changes.
Subnational government policymakers must understand their state’s financial liability created by
federal improper payment laws and how those improper payments are created. This financial
risk can create a budget busting financial liability that a state will have to pay requiring
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policymakers to make draconian decisions on tax rates, expenditure reductions, and/or service
delivery reductions. Subnational governments should establish sound improper payment policies
now, before the federal government starts to utilize its claw back provisions as a revenue source.
Ultimately, improper payments are about doing it right the first time. Correcting
mistakes always costs more time and money than doing it right from the beginning. Recovering
public dollars pits the government against its citizens, which is not the ideal position for
government to be in especially if the government is in error. Governments reducing improper
payments means they will have less recovery costs and will mitigate its impact on the impact of
improper payments on its own citizens.
Improper payments can also lead to increased fraudulent activity. If government internal
controls are not detecting payment errors, those same flaws can be exploited to commit fraud
against the taxpayers. Fraud in government programs means taxpayers must pay twice for the
same services, one time for the fraud and one time for the actual services.
While this paper has identified several ways for governments to reduce improper
payments, future research is needed in several areas:
•

Statistical method the federal government has established to set audit samples.

•

Cost/Benefit analysis of the Do Not Pay program.

•

How the Do Not Pay program is being implemented in subnational governments.

•

Cost/Benefit analysis of recovery efforts in the federal and subnational governments.

•

Cost/Benefit analysis of recovery audits in the federal and subnational governments.

•

Correlation of the increase of improper payments with the expansion of government
services and programs.

•

Effectiveness in PERM reports in reducing improper payments.
40

•

Effectiveness of state corrective action plans in reducing improper payments.

•

Analysis of the growth rate of improper payments and whether governments are
improving their success in identifying improper payments.
These areas of research will better inform policymakers and citizens on improper
payments.
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